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 A B S T R A C T  
This study analyzes the effect of female representation in top 
management, agency conflict mechanism on firm 
performance in Indonesia Manufacturing Firms. Agency 
conflict in this reseach consist of managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership, and debt. The sample of this study 
consist of 90 manufacturing firms over the period 2013-2017. 
This study measures firm performance with return on asset 
and return on equity. Data on this research were analyzed 
using multiple regression. This study found that female 
representation in top management and managerial 
ownership do not affect firm performance. This study also 
found that institutional ownership positively affects the firm 
performance and debt negatively affects the firm performance 
INTRODUCTION 
The thing that needs attention in 
creating the company's financial 
performance is company management, an 
agent who gets delegation from the 
company owner (principal) to decide the 
company. One of the exciting issues in 
company management is the gender of the 
company management. Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) suggest that the company's 
performance is determined through the 
manager's background characteristics. 
Hambrick (2007) indicates that the factors of 
managers affect the discretion of company 
managers. Women can improve company 
performance because women's characters, 
such as women, are more risk averse than 
men. Perryman, Fernando, & Tripathy 
(2016). Welbourne, Cycyota, and Ferrante 
(2007) suggest that women have better 
innovation traits and better problem-
solving processes that positively contribute 
to the company. This is supported by 
research conducted by Perryman et al. 
(2016), Cambrea, Lussana, Quarato, and 
Varacca Capello (2017), Giraldez-Puig, and 
Berenguer (2018). They found women at the 
top level have a positive effect on financial 
performance. Conflicting results were 
found by Gallego-Álvarez, García-Sánchez, 
and Rodríguez-Dominguez (2010) and 
Solakoglu and Demir (2016). Women at the 
top level did not affect the company's 
financial performance.  
Agency conflict is a critical issue to 
pay attention to regarding the company's 
financial performance. Agency conflict is a 
conflict that occurs between company 
owners and managers Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Agency conflicts can arise when 
managers of the company make decisions 
that generate profits for managers 
themselves and ignore the company owners' 
interests to harm the company owners 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). This causes the 
financial conflict mechanism to be an 
essential matter to pay attention to reduce 
agency conflicts.  
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According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), one of the mechanisms of agency 
conflict is managerial ownership. 
Managerial ownership is ownership of 
shares owned by company managers. 
Managerial ownership can align interests 
between owners and managers of the 
company. This is because, with managerial 
ownership, the manager is also the owner of 
the company. This is supported by research 
produced by Abu Haija and Alrabba (2017) 
and Nguyen, Nguyen, Nguyen, and Tran 
(2017), who find managerial ownership 
positively affects financial performance.  
The second conflict mechanism was 
in institutional ownership. Institutional 
ownership can reduce agency conflicts due 
to company managers (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Chung and Zhang (2011) suggest that 
the greater institutional ownership in 
company shares indicates a good 
governance structure. This is also supported 
by research conducted by Esther, Symon, 
Lawrence, and Sifunjo (2016), Abu Haija 
and Alrabba (2017), Kao, Hodgkinson, and 
Jaafar (2018), which found that institutional 
ownership has a positive effect on financial 
performance.  
The third conflict mechanism is debt. 
According to Jensen & Meckling (1976), debt 
is an agency conflict mechanism because, 
with debt, there will be supervision from 
creditors on decision making taken by 
company managers. Jensen (1986) also 
argues that by using debt, managers will be 
careful in making decisions because 
company managers must return the 
principal and interest on the debt that has 
been used. This is also supported by 
research conducted by Achmad and 
Amanah (2014), Sartini and Purbawangsa 
(2014), and Dewi and Wirasedana (2018), 
who found that debt has a positive effect on 
firm value.  
The opposite results regarding the 
effect of agency conflict mechanisms, 
namely managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership, and debt on company 
performance on financial performance, are 
obtained from the research of Khamis, 
Hamdan, and Elali (2015), Al-Matari, Al-
Matari, and Mohammed (2017). They found 
that Managerial ownership does not affect 
financial performance. Herdjiono and Sari 
(2017) found that institutional ownership 
harms financial performance. Similar 
research on institutional ownership was 
also found by AL-Najjar (2015) and Khamis 
et al. (2015), who found that institutional 
ownership does not affect financial 
performance. The opposite research results 
regarding the impact of debt on company 
performance were found by Javed, Younas, 
and Imran (2014), who found that debt did 
not affect financial performance, and 
Pandey and Sahu (2019). They discovered 
that debt hurt company performance.  
Based on different results obtained 
from previous studies on the influence of 
women on top-level management, 
managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership, and debt on financial 
performance. Therefore, this study 
surveyed the impact of female directors on 
upper-level control, managerial ownership, 
and institutional ownership on companies' 
financial performance in manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. In this research, manufacturing 
companies were chosen because they have 
the largest proportion of companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. It is 
essential to pay attention to improving 
financial performance, especially 
concerning women at the top management 
and managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership, and debt, which are 
mechanisms of agency conflict. 
  
THEORICAL BASIS 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) explain 
that leaders' strategic decisions significantly 
affect the company's output. The leader's 
characteristics affect how the leader 
interprets a condition and the decisions 
made in responding to these conditions. 
Gender diversity issues, which are unique 
characteristics of a leader, continue to 
develop as a value-driver in an 
organizational structure and corporate 
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governance (Marinova, Plantenga, & 
Remery, 2016). Women's role in a board of 
directors can reduce the potential for 
information bias in strategic decision-
making (Francoeur, Labelle, & Sinclair-
Desgagné, 2008). The presence of women on 
the board of directors indicates a broad 
understanding of the market and consumers, 
thereby enhancing its overall reputation and 
value. Several studies have also stated that 
female directors are more critical and 
careful, have more thoroughness than men, 
show collaborative skills and participatory 
leadership, and are more active in attending 
board meetings (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Eagly & Johnson, 1990; Kusumastuti & 
Sastra, 2007) 
With various innovations and 
contributions from women directors, it is 
expected that the company's performance 
will increase to affect financial performance. 
This is supported by research conducted by 
Perryman et al. (2016), Cambrea et al. (2017), 
Giraldez-Puig, and Berenguer (2018). They 
found that women at the top level of 
management have a positive effect on 
financial performance. Based on the 
description that has been explained, the first 
hypothesis of this study is formulated as 
follows: 
H1: Women at the top level of management 
have a positive effect on financial 
performance 
Information asymmetry in agency 
relationships is the number of differences in 
interests that the principal and agent have. 
One of the mechanisms that can minimize 
the difference in interests is managerial 
ownership, where part of the company's 
license is owned by the management 
(Sintyawati and Dewi, 2018). With 
managerial ownership, the government 
avoids opportunistic actions because every 
decision that is made affects its welfare, 
acting as a shareholder. 
By participating in part of the 
company, management is increasingly 
motivated to develop the company. It is 
hoped that the company's financial 
performance will also increase and the 
government's increasing ownership. This is 
supported by the findings of Abu Haija and 
Alrabba (2017) and Nguyen et al. (2017), 
which shows the positive effect of 
managerial ownership on financial 
performance. Based on the explanation 
above, the second hypothesis of this study is 
formulated as follows: 
H2: Managerial ownership has a positive 
effect on financial performance 
Sintyawati and Dewi (2018) define 
institutional ownership as share ownership 
owned by institutional investors, such as 
banks, insurance companies, pension fund 
companies, and financial companies. 
Institutional ownership is seen to reduce 
agency problems because principals receive 
institutional investors' assistance to oversee 
management's performance, which acts as 
an agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
With some of the ownership held by 
institutional investors, it is hoped that 
supervision will be more useful to anticipate 
forms of management actions and decisions 
that are not following the principals' 
interests. The existence of tighter oversight 
from institutional investors encourages 
management to carry out their duties to 
improve its financial performance properly. 
This is also supported by Esther et al., 2016; 
Abu Haija and Alrabba (2017), Kao et al. 
(2018), who found that institutional 
ownership positively affects financial 
performance. Based on the description 
above, the third hypothesis of this study is 
formulated as follows: 
H3: Institutional ownership has a positive 
effect on financial performance 
In supporting company funding, 
management must consider the form and 
composition of its most appropriate 
financing. The government can use both 
internal and external funding sources, 
where each form of funding has different 
risks and consequences. Using external 
funding, debt; It is expected that the 
company can improve company 
performance through the tax-deductible 
effect (Achmad & Amanah, 2014). Debt 
financing results in loan interest, reducing 
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taxable income figures, thereby increasing 
its net profit. 
Debt funding can also be used to 
reduce agency problems because of 
creditors' supervision regarding 
management decision-making (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The creditors' 
responsibility results in leadership from 
creditors to ensure that the company can 
pay adequate debt. The principal can use 
this to oversee management performance 
because creditors' supervision makes 
management more careful in making 
decisions to improve the company's 
performance in the future. Similar research 
also supports that debt positively affects 
firm value (Achmad & Amanah, 2014; Dewi 
& Wirasedana, 2018; Sartini & Purbawangsa, 
2014). 




Population and Sample 
The population of this research is 
manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. In this study, 
sampling using a purposive sampling 
technique with the criteria 1) manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during 2013-2017 2) financial 
statements published in rupiah 3) 
companies have positive equity. 
 
Criteria Total 
Population: manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange 2013-2017 
134 
The company does not meet the purposive sampling criteria:  
(1) The company is registered with IDX for the period 2013-2017 
and has complete data  
10 
(2) Financial reports published in rupiah  27 
(3) The company has positive equity  7 
Companies that meet the criteria for purposive sampling 90 
Observation period 5 
Total observations 450 
Outlier 21 
The full sample was 429 
 
Method of Collecting Data 
The data in this study were collected 
using documentation techniques. This 
study's documentation was carried out by 
collecting financial data and ownership of 
manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-2017. 
 
Data Analysis Technique 
The data in this study were 






KKP: Financial Performance 
WTA: Women in Upper Management 
KMA: Managerial Ownership 
KIN: Institutional Ownership 
UTG: Debt 
UPR: Company Size 
The dependent variable in this study 
is financial performance. Financial 
performance in this study is measured using 
the return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE). ROA in this study is 
KKPit (ROA, ROE) = α + β1WTAit + β2KMAit + β3KINit + β3UTGit + 
β3UPRit + ԑ 
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calculated using the formula net income 
divided by total assets, while ROE is 
computed using net income divided by 
equity. 
This study's independent variables 
are women at the top level of management, 
managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership, and debt. Women in top 
management are measured using the 
number of women in upper management 
divided by the company's number of power. 
Managerial ownership is calculated using 
the number of shares owned by the 
company's management divided by 
outstanding shares. In this study, 
institutional ownership is measured using 
the number of shares held by bank 
institutions, mutual funds, insurance 
companies, and pension funds divided by 
the number of shares outstanding. Debt in 
this study is measured using total debt 
divided by total assets. 
The control variable in this study is 
company size. Company size in this study is 
measured using the natural logarithm of the 
company's total assets. 
 
Variable Equation Source 
Financial Performance (ROA) Net Profit 
Total Assets 
Khamis et al. (2015) 
Yazdanfar & Öhman, (2015) 
Financial Performance (ROE) Net Profit 
Total Equity 
Kao et al. (2018) 
Women in Upper 
Management (WTA) 
The Number of Women in Upper 
Management 
The Number of Company Management 
Cambrea et al. (2017) 
Perryman et al. (2016) 
Managerial Ownership 
(KMA) 
The Number of Shares Owned by 
Company Management  
The Number of Shares Outstanding 
Khamis et al. (2015) 




The Number of Shares Owned by 
Institution 
The Number of Shares Outstanding 
Khamis et al. (2015)  
Abu Haija dan Alrabba 
(2017) 
Kao et al. (2018) 
Debt (UTG) Total Debt 
Total Assets  
Khamis et al. (2015)  
Perryman et al. (2016) 
Company Size (UPR) Ln (Total Assets) Khamis et al. (2015) 






The data used in this study are 
financial performance (ROA, ROE), women 
at the top level of management (WTA), 
managerial ownership (KMA), institutional 
ownership (KIN), debt (UTG), and company 
size (UPR). The results of the descriptive 
statistics of this study can be seen in table 1. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Average Std.Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Financial Performance (ROA)  0,0543 0,0706 0,3120 -0,1358 
Financial Performance (ROE) 0,0847 0,1131 0,3998 -0,3036 
Women in Upper Management (WTA)  0,1022 0,1418 0,5833 0,0000 
Managerial Ownership (KMA) 0,0154 0,0406 0,2460 0,0000 
Institutional Ownership (KIN) 0,2469 0,2536 0,9254 0,0000 
Debt (UTG)  0,4397 0,1946 0,8849 0,0662 
Company Size (UPR)  28,2704 1,6082 33,3202 24,4142 
Source: Processed data 
 
Table 1 shows that the financial 
performance variable (ROA) has a 
minimum value of -0.1358 and a maximum 
value of 0.312 and the mean and standard 
deviation values are 0.0543 and 0.0706, 
respectively. This shows that the sample of 
this study, on average, can obtain a net 
profit of 5.43% of the total assets it owns. 
The financial performance variable (ROE) 
has a minimum value of -0.3036 and a 
maximum value of 0.3998, and the mean 
and standard deviation values are 0.0847 
and 0.131, respectively. This shows that the 
sample of this study, on average, can obtain 
a net profit of 8.47% of the total equity it has. 
Women in Upper Management (WTA) 
show a minimum score of 0.0000 and a 
maximum value of 0.5833 and mean and 
standard deviation of 0.1022 and 0.1418. 
This indicates that the number of women at 
the top management level is only 10.22% of 
the sample companies' total top 
management. The agency conflict 
mechanism, namely managerial ownership 
(KMA) and institutional ownership (KIN), 
show the following results: managerial 
ownership has a minimum value of 0.0000 
and a maximum value of 0.2460 and an 
average and standard deviation 0.0154 and 
0, 0406. At the same time, institutional 
ownership shows a minimum amount of 
0.0000 and a maximum value of 0.9254 and 
the mean and standard deviation of 0.2469 
and 0.2536. This indicates that of the total 
outstanding shares, 1.54% of shares are 
owned by management, and institutional 
investors own 24.69%. The debt variable 
(UTG) has a minimum value of 0.0662 and a 
maximum value of 0.8849, and an average 
value and standard deviation of 0.4397 and 
0.1946. This shows that the sample 
companies in this study have an average 
debt of 43.97% of total assets owned. 
 
Table 2. Regression Analysis Results 
Financial Performance Measured Using ROA  





Women in Upper Management (WTA) 
 
-0,0241 0,0297 -0,8104 0,4182 
Managerial Ownership (KMA) 0,0816 0,0939 0,8689 0,3854 
Institutional Ownership (KIN) 0,0456 0,0191 2,3840 0,0176 
Debt (UTG) -0,1791 0,0265 -6,7661 0,0000 
Company Size (UPR) 0,0075 0,0030 2,5226 0,0120 
F 42,7627 
Sig-F 0,0000 
Adj R2 0,3279 
Source: Processed data 
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Financial Performance Measured Using ROE 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-
Statistic 
Sig. 
Women in Upper Management (WTA) -0,0252 0,0484 -0,5197 0,6036 
Managerial Ownership (KMA) 0,1073 0,1468 0,7311 0,4651 
Institutional Ownership (KIN) 0,0864 0,0335 2,5826 0,0101 
Debt (UTG) -0,1780 0,0457 -3,8981 0,0001 
Company Size (UPR) 0,0098 0,0048 2,0492 0,0411 
F 19,4139 
Sig-F 0,0000 
Adj R2 0,1770 
Source: Processed data 
In table 2, it can be seen that the 
influence of women at top-level 
management on financial performance. In 
Table 2, using ROA, it can be seen that the 
significance level is 0.4182 and the 
significance level using ROE is 0.6036. This 
shows that the significance level is> 0.005, 
and women at the top level have no effect on 
financial performance, so that the first 
hypothesis in this study is rejected. This 
study's results are supported by Solakoglu 
and Demir's (2016) research and Gallego-
Álvarez et al. (2010). Women at the upper 
management level do not affect the 
company's financial performance because 
women's proportion is still small in 
companies in Indonesia. It can be seen in the 
descriptive statistics in this study that an 
average of only 10.22% so that it has not 
been able to influence financial performance. 
This study contradicts the research 
conducted by Perryman et al. (2016), 
Cambrea et al. (2017), Giraldez-Puig, and 
Berenguer (2018). They found that women 
at the top level of management have a 
positive effect on financial performance.  
In table 2, it can be seen that the 
effect of managerial ownership on financial 
performance. In Table 2, using ROA, it can 
be seen that the significance level is 0.3854 
and the significance level using ROE is 
0.4651. This shows that the level of 
significance> 0.005 and managerial 
ownership does not affect financial 
performance, so that the second hypothesis 
of this study is rejected. The results of this 
study are supported by research conducted 
by Khamis et al. (2015), Al-Matari and Al-
Arussi (2016), and Obembe, Olaniyi, and 
Soetan (2016). This is because managerial 
ownership in Indonesia is still small in 
companies in Indonesia. The descriptive 
statistics of this study indicate that the 
average administrative right is 1.54%. This 
causes managerial ownership to be unable 
to align the interests between owners and 
managers in the company. Similar research 
is produced by Abu Haija and Alrabba (2017) 
and Nguyen et al. (2017), who found that 
managerial ownership positively affects 
financial performance.  
In table 2, you can see the results of 
this study. In Table 2, using ROA, it can be 
seen that the significance level is 0.0176 and 
the significance level using ROE is 0.0101. 
This shows that the level of significance is 
<0.005 and institutional ownership has a 
positive effect on financial performance so 
that the third hypothesis of this study is not 
rejected. This study's results are supported 
by research conducted by Esther et al., 2016 
and Kao et al. (2018). This shows that the 
supervision carried out by institutional 
ownership in the company can run 
effectively and reduce agency conflicts in 
the company so that the company's financial 
performance can improve. The opposite 
research results were found by AL-Najjar 
(2015) and Khamis et al. (2015), who found 
that institutional ownership harms 
company performance. Herdjiono and Sari 
(2017) also found conflicting results; namely, 
institutional ownership did not affect 
financial performance.  
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In table 2, you can see the results of 
this study. In Table 2, using ROA, it can be 
seen that the significance level is 0.0000 and 
the significance level using ROE is 0.0001. 
This shows that the significance level is 
<0.005, and debt harms financial 
performance so that the fourth hypothesis of 
this study is rejected. The results of this 
study are supported by research conducted 
by Yazdanfar and Öhman (2015), Nwude, 
Itiri, Agbadua, and Udeh (2016), Abu Haija 
and Alrabba (2017), which found that debt 
harms company performance. This shows 
that the creditor carries out the higher the 
debt, the more supervision. Supervision 
carried out by creditors causes the 
company's management to be less flexible in 
making decisions that exist by the company 
because it is limited by creditors, leading to 
a decline in company performance. This is 
also supported by Stulz (1990). The 
conflicting results found by Javed et al. 
(2014) found that debt does not affect 
financial performance. Achmad and 
Amanah (2014), Sartini and Purbawangsa 
(2014), and Dewi and Wirasedana (2018) 
also found the opposite result. Namely, debt 




Based on the analysis, this study 
provides results. Namely, women at the top 
management and managerial ownership 
level do not affect financial performance, 
institutional ownership has a positive effect 
on financial performance, and debt harms 
financial performance. 
This research has implications for 
the things that investors need to pay 
attention to when making investment 
decisions. Institutional ownership as an 
agency conflict mechanism is an important 
thing to pay attention to because it can 
improve company performance. Higher 
debt to the company can reduce company 
performance. 
This study has limitations. This 
study only looks at upper-level 
management's characteristics only in terms 
of gender and agency conflict mechanisms 
are limited to managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership, and debt. 
Subsequent research, namely research, can 
be carried out by paying more attention to 
upper-level management characteristics 
apart from genders, such as the size of the 
board of directors, tenure of directors, age of 
directors, and educational background of 
directors. Meanwhile, the company agency 
conflict mechanism can add a board of 
commissioners and an audit committee as 
part of corporate governance. 
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